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TERRITORIALITY AND M ORAL D ISSENSUS: THOUGHTS 
ON ABORTION, SLA'~lERY, GAY fv1~l{_,'UAGE At"'D FAMfLY 
VALUES 
By Seth F. Kreimer* 
I. 1'-JTRODUCTION 
A house divided can sometimes claim virtues and I am on record 
praising those claims. Five years ago, as a supporter of women's right 
to choose abortion, I contemplated Ll-Je possible demise of Roe v. 
Wade. 1 At the time, it appeared that an emerging conservative majority 
on the Supreme Court would free state legislatures of constitutional 
restraint, leaving a state by state patchwork of abortion legislation 
reminiscent of the years immediately before Roe. I explored the degree 
to which restrictive states would be able to interfere with efforts of 
women to take advantage of the regime of their more liberal neigh-
bors.2 
In that context, territorial limitation of state legislative jurisdiction 
was a boon to liberty . I argued that there were reasons both of prece-
dent and policy favoring a system in which states would be free to 
adopt moral norms binding within their borders, but not free to export 
them.3 Territoriality had the virtue of consistency with the American 
• Copyrigh t June 1997; Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. This essay has 
benefitted .;nonnous!y from the comments and assistance of my colleagues Sally Gordon, Howard 
Lesrj ck, and Barbara Woodhouse . Tney deserve my public thanks for their generosity of time and 
insight, but bear no responsibility for any mistakes or missteps contained in the following pages. 
I. 4 JO US.I 13(1973). 
2. See Seth F. Kreimer, "Bw Whoever Treasures Freedom ... ": The Right to Travel and 
Extralerritorial Abortions, 9 1 M ICH. L. REv. 907 (1 993); Seth F. Kreimer, The Law of Choice and 
Choice of Law: Abortion , the Right to Tra vel and Extraterritorial Regulation in American Feder-
alism, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 451 (1992). 
3. ln the context of abortion , the most relevant precedent was Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 
U.S. 809 ( 1975), where Lhe Court overturned the conviction of a Virginia newspaper for runn ing 
an ad regarding the availability of New York abortion. The Court commented: 
The Virginia Legislature could not have regulated the advertiser's activity in New 
York , and obviously could not have proscribed the activity in that State . ... NeiL'ler 
could Virg inia prevent its residents from traveling to New York to obtain those ser ;ic-
161 
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traditions of moral pluralism combined wit:'l free interstate travel an.d 
national citizenship. It had the advantage of corresponding to 
commonsense perceptions of law linked to a straightforward explana-
tion of iegal authority. And, most important to advocates of reproduc-
tive freedom, it gave women some measure of choice as to the Jaw 
which govemed them; escape from an oppressive iegal context was 
available to kilowledgeable women who could raise the price of a 
round trip bus ticket. 4 
If the right to punish rnoral dev iations were limited to a s tate ' s 
own terTi tory, women would not enter neighboring states carrying the 
abortion legis1ation of their home state with them Eke a ball and chain . 
As long as at least a few states retained abortion rights , those rights 
would be potentially available to women elsewhere in the country. 
As it rums out, my territorial enthusiasm, while shared by the 
Supreme Court in at least one recent case,5 has been of secondary 
importance in the area of abortion rights. Roe was in fact reaffirmed in 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, and for most women, the "due burdens" 
which Casey sanctions have not been so onerous that in most cases 
"migratory abortion" has been a necessary option.6 In the areas where 
es, or. as the State conceded prosecute them for going there . Virginia possessed no 
authority to regulate the services provided in New York .... 
!d. at 822-24 (citations omitted). 
4. The escape route was far from perfect. for it depended on access to both information 
about extraterritorial opportunities and the capacity to take advantage of them. This meant that 
women who were young. poor or uninformed were often unable to take advantage of the escape 
route. See, e.g., James Shelton, ET .<\L., Abortion Utilization: Does Travel Distance Matter, 8 
FAMILY PLANNING PERSPECTIVES 260, 262 (1976) {fmding a negative correlation between acDr-
tion rates and distance from abortion facilities strongest for black teenagers); NA.NNETfE J. DAVlS, 
FROM CRIME TO CHOICE 199 (1985) ("Out of state travel costs prevented most poor minorities 
fonn using the new abortion broker arrangements [before Roe]"). ld. 
On the informational barriers before Roe. see, e.g., NANNETTE 1 DAVIS. FROM C!UME TO 
CHOICE 163-70 (1985) (typically four intermediaries) . Survey Jata in Steven Polgar & Ellen Fried, 
The Bad Old Days: Clandesrine Abortions Anwng rhe Poor in New York Ciry Before Liberaliza· 
lion of the Abortion Law, 8 FAMILY PLANNING PERSPECTIVES 125, 126 (1976), suggests that be-
fore Roe, at least arnong the women of child bearing age in surveyed poverty areas, only four 
percent knew of a physician who could provide an abortion. Of those who sought to tem1inate 
pregnancy only two percent used doctors, and 80% attempted to terminate pregnancies themselves. 
!d. 
5. See BMW of North America v. Gore , 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1597 at n.l6 (1996) (comity, fed -
eralism and sovereignty prevent a state from seeking to control activities outside of its boundaries 
by assessing punitive damages based on such activities) citing Bigelow, 421 U.S. 809 (1975); but 
cf U.S. v. Edge Broadcasting, 509 U.S. 418 (1993) (sustaining prohibition of advertising for legal 
out of state lonerJ). 
6. But cf A Woman 's Choice-East Side Womens' Clinic v. Newman, 904 F. Supp. 1434, 
1453-55 (S.D. Ind. 1995) (reponing an increase in out of state abortions after Mississippi impcsed 
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state regulations in fact verge on the prohibitive-regulation of young 
women 's abortion rights--extraterritorial abortions have softened the 
regime.7 
No interesting issue ever truly dies, and this symposium presents 
the issue of territoriality with the emotional pola..it ies reversed for me, 
for sometimes oppression consists not in binding individuals unwill-
ingly , but in refusing to allow them to bind themselves. Politically, 
re ligio us ly , and morally, I see the availabiii ty of same-sex marriage as 
an unambiguous good. Politically, same-sex marriage pro vides a means 
of affirming lo·v' ing relationships, build ing fa mily stabili ty in the m idst 
of an increasing unstable social context, and acknowledging u'1e equal 
entitlement of gay and lesbian citizens to recognition as members of 
the American polity. Religiously, I happen to be a memb-er of one of 
the denominations that celebrates same-sex unions.8 Morally, the refus-
al to a llow celebration of such marriages , and a fortiori , the refusal to 
recognize marriages celebrated elsewhere strikes me as a gratuitously 
cruel act of hostility toward gays and lesbians. 
Yet I realize my views are far from universa l, and these commit-
ments exist in practical tension with my sense of the territorially limit-
ed moral jurisdiction of states in the American polity. One of the vir-
tues of a territorial federalism is precisely that it allows conflicting 
communities of commitment to coexist within a single national polity, 
while allowing individuals to move fluidly among them. On issues of 
fundamental life choices, America has often been a house d ivided, with 
the individual citizens entitled to decide the rooms in which they wish 
to live . 
The principle of territoriality establishes that Georgia cannot pros-
a 24 hour waiting period which effectively required two trips to abortion providers). 
7. See, e.g. ,Virginia Cartoof & Lorraine Klcnnan, Paremal Coment for Abortion: The 
Impact of 1he Massachusetts Law, 76 A.J.P.H. 398 (1986) (es timating that roughly half of Massa-
chusetts teenagers seeking abortions traveled outside of the state) ; Tamar Lewin , Parental Consent 
to Aborrion: How Enforcement Can Vary, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 1992. at A I (reporting that Indi-
ana abonion clinics advise teenagers seeking abortions without parental consent to travel to neigh-
boring Kentucky or Illinois); cf Commonwealth v. Hartford, No. 95-98. (C.P. Sullivan Cty, Pa. 
1996) (prosecution of adult who assisted Pennsylvania minor in traveling to New York to obtain 
abortion without parental consent). 
8. See Shahar v. Bowers, 70 F.3d 1218, 1222-23 (llth Cir. 1995), vacated and reh'g grant-
ed, 78 F.3d 499 (11th Cir !996) (challenging a discharge of state employee who married her lesbi-
an partner in a .Reconstructionist Jewish ceremony, observing that Reconstructionist Judaism "re-
gards same sex marriages as acceptable and desirable") (rev' d en bane, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 
13069 (11th Cir. 1997); see id. at *60 (Tjoflat, J., concurring) (acknowledging position of Recon-
structionist Jews); id. at *64-67 (Godbold, J., dissent) (acknowledging position of Reconstruction-
is! Jews). 
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ecute its own gay and lesbian citizens for their sexual activities during 
v isits to California. But it also allows Georgia to define as obscene and 
prohibit materials-however acceptable in California-which California 
residents may seek to distribute w ithin Georgia itself. Indeed, part of 
the implicit power of the plaintiffs' case in Romer v. Evans9 was that 
::he Colorado Constitutional Amendment eviscerated the ability of local 
cor:nmunities to set their own moral agenda. 
H I v13.s right that even withou t Roe, Pennsylnnia could not seek 
u.:; export its moralistic prohibitions to New Jersey by punishing Perm-
sylv c~n ia citizens for seeking abortions guaran<eed by the New Jersey 
C::>nstitution, why should Hawai i be able to export its celebration of 
szcrne-s:.::x ma<riages to Pennsylvania? If pregnant women d id not carry 
personal law vvith them li.ke a bail and chain into a new state, why 
should gay and lesbian couples be able to bear it li.k:e a souvenir shield 
on returning from a more welcoming jurisdiction? 
Ii. CONFLICT OF LAWS: THE RULE OF UNIVERSAL V ALID!TY AND 
PuBLIC POLICY 
One a11swer could arise from black letter conflict of laws doctrine. 
fhe abortion problem involves one set of conflicts principles, whi le 
marriage validity is governed by quite different maxims. It has often 
been thought dubious for one state to enforce the penal statutes on 
conduct in a11other jurisdiction, and even in the loosest modern con-
flicts analysis a state has some claim to impose a basic moral order on 
actions within its borders. By contrast, the standard conflict of law 
doctr.u!es regarding personal status are quite d ifferent; hornbook law 
holds that marriages valid in the jurisdiction where they are celebrated 
are, in the normal course of events, valid everywhere. 10 In a mobile 
society where a vveb of personal entitlements grows from mari tai status, 
the personal hardships associated with marriages u'1at fade in and out of 
existence as the partners pass state boundaries counsel strongly in favor 
of universal recognition of locally valid marriages. 
·--------------------------------------------------------------
9. 11 6 S. Ct. 1620 (1996) . 
10. E.g .• Loughran v. Loughran, 292 U.S . 216, 223, 225 (1934) (Brandeis, J.); RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (2d) Section 283(2) (!971). For an early and in-
tluential case invoking the principle on behalf of a New York couple seeking to avoid a New 
York statutory prohibition of remarriage after divorce by marf';ing in New Jersey , see Ponsford v. 
Johnson, 19 F. Cas. 9 (S.D.N.Y. 1847) (No. 11,266), followed in Van Vocrhis v. Brintnall, 86 
N.Y. 18 (1881). See also State v. Shattuck, 69 Vt. 403 (1897) (same: i;1 the absence of explicit 
statutory prohibition of extraterritorial remarriage after divorce, marriage valid at the place of con-
tracting will be recognized). 
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Other things being equal, this doctrine could easily tip the balance 
in states that have no other binding law on Ll-Je subject. Indeed, in the 
parallel situation of. inter-racial marriages before Loving v. Virginia, 11 
even some southern courts invoked the doctrine of universal validity to 
permit recognition of interracial marriages contracted in other states, 
but impermissible under local law . 12 In a state where hostility to same-
sex relationships is not already embodied in statute, it might be rea-
sonable to expect this position ;:o carry the day, particularly if locai 
statutes incorporate the presumption in favor of marital valid ity. State 
courts which already have creat iY·": iy interpreted their domestic rel ations 
laws to recognize the reali ty of sa111e-sex relationships in the context of 
adoption or v isitation disputes 13 are particularly likely to read their 
11. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
12. Miller v. Lucks , 203 Miss. 824 (! 948) (recognizing extraterritorial interracial marriage of 
non-dom iciliaries for estate administration purposes); State v. Ross 76 N.C. 212 (1877) (dismiss-
ing bigamy prosecution); Stevenson v. Gray. 56 Ky. (17 B. Mon.) 193 (1856) ; Whittington v. 
McGask.ii!, 65 Fla. 162 (i 913) (recognizing interracial marriage between Kansas residents fer 
estate ad ministration purposes). See a!so Pearson v. Pearson, 51 Cal. 120 (1875) (recognizing 
marriage contracted between Utah residents before moving to California, where interracial mar-
riage was prohibited); Medway v. Needham, 16 Mass 156, 159-60 ( 18 19) (recognizing interracial 
marriage contracted by Massachusens residents extraterritorially). 
In some of these states, however, the courts, while willing to recognize interracial marriag-
es contracted between domiciliaries of other states were unwilling to allow their own domiciliaries 
to evade domesti c prohibitions. See, e.g .. State v. Kennedy, 76 N.C. 251 (1876) (refusing to recog-
nize interracial marriage contracted between North Carolina residents in South Carolina); cf In re 
Takahashi's Estate, 129 P.2d 217, 220 (Mont. 1942) (construing statutory prohibition on recogni-
tion of extraterritorial interracial marriage to apply only to marriage contracted by Montana resi-
dents seeking to evade prohibition). 
13 . E.g., In re Custody of H.S. H-K, i93 Wis. 2d 649 (1995) (recognizing "parent-like" 
relationship for purposes of custody and visitation where same-sex couple had agreed to conceive 
a child, engaged in mutual dedication ceremony naming both partners as child's parents, named 
child with both par..ners ' names , and raised chi ld together for five years despite refusal to allow 
adoption by same-sex couple on statutory grounds in Interest of Angel Lace M., 184 Wis. 2d 492 
(!994)); A.C. v. C.B., 113 N.M. 581 (1992) (au thorizi ng recognition of visitation agreement be-
tween members of di~ solved same-sex relationship who had raised the child j ointly for seven 
years); In re M.M.D. & B.H.lvl. , 662 A.2d 837 (Ct. App. D.C. 1995) (allowing same sex couple to 
adopt despite determination in Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307 (Ct. App. D.C. 1995) 
(refusing to require issuance of a marriage license to same sex couple)); In re Jacob, 86 N.Y.2d 
651 (1 995) (approving second parent adoption by same-sex couple despite refusal to approve 
standing to seek visitation to same-sex partner of biological mother in In the Matter of Alison D. 
v. Virginia M., 77 N.Y.2d 65 I (1991)); Adoption of Tammy. 416 Mass. 205, 206 (1993) (approv-
ing joint adoption by same-sex couple who "are each functioning, separately and together as the 
custodial and psychological parents" of the child); Adoptions of B.L.V.B. and E.L.Y.B., 160 Vt. 
368, 376 (1 993) (approving adoption by second parent in same sex couple where both partners 
had "acted as a parent .. . from the moment [the children] were born"' despite subsequent refusal 
to recognize same-sex co-parent as entitled to standing to seek visitation. Tichena l v. Dexter 1997 
Vt. LEXIS 16.); J.A.L. v. E.P.H., 682 A.2d 1314 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (acknowledging lesbian 
couple who jointly decided on artificial insemination, and sought to establish joint parental rela-
DD [~I d @• 
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domestic conflicts law in light of the presumption of marital validity. 
In an optimistic scenario, therefore, we might hope that in the 
short run the symbolic exclusion of same-sex marriages from local 
celebration would suffice to placate the forces hostile to such relation-
ships, at the same time that ease of interstate travel could allow couples 
who seek marriage to achieve it. In the longer run a growing number 
of same-sex marriages solemnized extraterritorially could dilute the fear 
of the perceived "unnaturai" nature of those relationships with day to 
day contact. This was, arguably, the path of the law with respect to 
divorce. For a substan tial period of time in the mid-twentie th century, 
low-visibility availability of migratory divorces and other faci1itative 
devices coexisted ill eguiiibrium with officially restrictive domestic 
divorce laws in a workable ideological compromise. 14 After a genera-
tion of experience with the normalization of divorce, no-fault swept the 
country. 15 
But optimism in this case may be the triumph of hope over expe-
rience. The "migratory divorce" compromise depended on the relative 
unobtrusiveness of the practice combined with tacit offic ial receptive-
ness.16 The issue of same-sex marriages is anyt.~ing but unobtrusive. 
Rather than emerging in a series of incremental evasions, it is bursting 
on the national scene in the mantle of dramatic state constitutional 
activism. Same-sex marriage has not rested quietly in the recesses of 
low-level judicial practice, but has been drawn to t.~e center of national 
partisan politics. Republicans pronounced the issue of same-sex mar-
riage as a litmus of family values in the 1996 presidential election, 
tions as a "non-traditional family'" for purposes of standing to seek partial custody); Adoption of 
Two Children by ·H.N.R .• 666 A.2d 535 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995) (same-sex domestic 
partner of child's biological mother may adopt child, despite court's unwillingness to require 
extension of health insurdllce benefits to same sex partners in Rutgers Council of AAUP Chapters 
v. Rutgers State Univ .. 689 A.2d 828 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997)). 
14. See, e.g., Max Rheinstein, lv1ARRIAGE STABILITY, DIVORCE AND THE LAW 51-105 (!972) 
(arguing that "cooperation of courts has made it possible for the great bulk of divorces to be ob-
tained upon the ground of mutual consent which is frowned upon by the official law of every state 
of the union"); !d. at 253-57 (arguing that the "make-believe" is an "indispensable part" of a via-
ble compromise on an issue of "ultimate value"). 
15. Even on the divorce front, of course, my colleague Barbara Woodhouse has emphasized 
that "fault" has not been universally exiled from divorce proceedings, and there is now a growing 
enthusiasm for re-injecting it where it has been absent. See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Sex. Lies 
and Dissipation: The Discourse of Fault in a No Fault Era, 82 GEO. L.J. 2525 (1994). Still, the 
availability of the option of divorce is today far closer to the Nevada of the 1950's than to New 
York of that era. 
16. RHEINSTEIN, supra note II at 255-57 (arguing that " the process would not have unrolled 
in the limelight of publicity"). 
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Democrats acceded, and an increasing number of states have adopted 
statutes that explicitly preclude the recognition of same-sex marriages. 
Analysis of the probable results of Hawaii's ultim ate adoption of same-
sex marriages, therefore, must proceed on the assumption that in a 
number of states, hostile legislatures will embody a refusal to recognize 
same-sex marriages in statute. 
Once a strong ideological position is embodied in a positive state 
statute, the doctrines of comity are unlikely to carry the day unaided, 
foe wherever it is initially celebrated, marriage is an ongoing personal 
relationship in which the state of ultimate domici le is ii !<ely to assert a 
strong interest. If we want to imagine an equilibrium in which states 
are impelled by reasons of comity to accept within their borders ongo-
ing relationships to which they are ideologically opposed, the closest 
historical parallels are not comforting. 
The historical record of conflicts doctrine dating from the wrench-
ing national dispute over slavery gives one indication that stable extra-
terri torial recognition of a controversial personal status is unlikely. 
Despite the effort to accommodate differences between commitments to 
slavery and freedom, American doctrine has been that ultimately each 
state has authority over the personal status of those domiciled within its 
boundaries. 'Where one jurisdiction is willing to regard the status con-
ferred by another jurisdiction as "odious," recognition has been denied. 
In the 19th century, the struggle over slavery was a crucible in 
which the clash of moral visions between states forged conflict of laws 
doctrine. Early in the century, it was not uncommon for state courts to 
defer to the moral commitments of sister states. States accorded extra-
terTitorial recognition to status decisions at odds with the forum state ' s 
public poLicy. Freedmen who attained their status by legitimate resi-
deiiCe in free states retained freedom on return to some slave jurisdic-
tions.17 Slaves traveling with their masters in free states, or even so-
jouming with them for brief periods of time were treated by free states 
17. E.g., Viole t and William v. Stephens 16 (5 Litt. Sel. Cas. ) 147 (1812) (recognizing Penn-
sylvania statu te granting freedom to Pennsylvania slave as effectively altering status of former 
slaves returned to Kentucky). See, e.g., Rankin v. Lydia, 9 Ky. (2 A.K. M<mh) 467, 476 (1820) 
(holding that freedom becomes vested by seven years of Indiana residency is the leading case). 
Because freedom is a natural ri ght, "( i]f these rights are once vested in ... any other portion of 
the United States, can it be compatible with the spirit of our confederated government to deny 
their existence in any other pan?" /d. at 188. 
Louisiana had an equally strong line of cases, ended by statute in I 846. See ROBERT Cov-
ER, JUSTICE A CCUSED 96 (1975); PAUL FiNKELMAN, AN lMPERFECf UNION 206-! I (1981) . See 
generally id. at 188-90 (reviewing the "numerous cases [in which] the courts of L~e slave states 
respected the power of free states to liberate slaves"). /d. at 188. 
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h . 1 18 as retamtng t elf s ave status. 
But these accommodations were matters of interstate comity 
adopted ultimately at the discretion of the forum, and as the willingness 
to accede to divergent moral visions decayed, so did comity. From the 
founding of the republic, it had been clear to all concerned that the 
recognition of the master-slave relationship could not be imposed 
extraterritorially against the policy of the receiving state. The impetus 
for the ii1clusion of the Fugitive Slave Clause in Article IV was the 
underst211ding that in its absence, a free state would be entitled to treat 
a slave who escaped to its territory as free pursuarlt to locai law.19 
As the controversy over slavery grew more bitter in the years 
before the Civil War, comity dissolved and the Constitution was held 
to impose no limit on the rights of both free a.'1d slave states to pursue 
u'teir own rnoral visions within their borders. The Supreme Court an-
nounced that because "every State has an undoubted right to determine 
the status, or domestic and social condition, of the persons domiciled 
within its territory, " slave states bore no obligation to recognize a sta-
tus of freedom acquired in free states.20 
18 . Thus, Pennsylvmia, New Jersey and New York during the early part of the 19th cenmry 
granted stamtory periods of protection to the interest of slave-owners passing through their juris· 
dictions. See PAUL FINKELMAN, AN l.MPERFECT UNJON, 46, 76 (198 1). Ohio by jadicial interpreta· 
tion recognized the servile stams of slaves passing through its jurisdiction, id. at 89-92; as did 
L'1diana, e.g .• Sewell's Slaves 3 AM. JUR. 404, 404-07 (1 830); Illinois, e.g .. W i!lard v. People, 5 
Ill. ( 4 Scam .) 461 (1843); and California, e.g., Ex Parte Archy, 9 Cal. 147 ( 1858). 
19. The text of the Clause provides that no slave escaping to a free state shall "in conse· 
quence of an y law or Regulation therein, be discharged from" slavery. At the Virginia ratifyi ng 
convention, Mad ison adduced as a point in favor of the proposed ccnstir~tion that :o'1e Fugiti·ve 
Slave Clause al tered the legal s tams quo. "At present, if any slave elopes to ar> y of those s tar~s 
where slaves are free, he becomes emancipated by the ir laws; for the laws of :he ,; ; .. :,;:; :.ccc unch~­
itable to one another in this respect." 3 JOHNATHAN ELIOTI , DEBAT"...S ON THe' P..DOJYTION OF THE 
FEDERAL CONST. 453 ( 1974). See, Robert Cover J USTICE ACCUSED 88 ( 1975); Paul Finkelman, 
AN IMPERFECT UNION 27-28 (198 1); Prigg v. Pennsylvania 41 U.S. 539, 6i2 (1842) (" It is mani · 
fest from this consideration, that if the Constitution had not cvntained thi s clause, every non-slave-
holding :;mte in the Union wou ld have been at liberty to have declared free all runaway slaves 
coming within its limits .... ") . !d. 
20. Strader v. Graham, 51 U.S. 82, 93-94 (1850). Justice Taney stated t..ha t this sovereign 
prerogative was lim ited ''in so far as the powers of the States in this respec t are restrained, or 
duties and obligations imposed upon them, by the Constituti on of the United States." ld. At 93. In 
dealing with the smtus of Kenmcky slaves who had, by Ohio law attained freedom from their 
sojourn in Ohio, however, he held that: 
There is nothing in the Consti tution of the United States that can in any degree contro l 
the law of Kenmcky upon thi s subject. And the condition of the negroes, therefore, as 
to freedom or slavery, after their re turn, depended al together upon the laws of that 
State, and could not be influenced by the laws of Ohio. 
!d. At 93-94. 
In the Kenmcky courts, Strader marked a limitation of the comity accorded to free states 
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Equally, free states claimed autJ10rity to gra.nt liberty within their 
borders to slaves who lawfully passed into their jurisdiction even tem-
porarily.21 Lemmon v. People22 is emblematic. The prevailing opinion 
in Lemmon acknowledged that the guarantees of Article IV were de-
signed to "constitute the citizens of the United States one people" and 
to "secure a community of intercourse.'m The court nonetheless re-
jected the claim of a Virginia res ident that she was entitled to retain 
her servant m slavery while passing through abolit:: onist I'-Jew York. 
A citizen of Virginia, havin g hls horne in that st1te and ::ev~r havi11g been 
with in the State of New Yo rk. has the same rights unde• our la'NS which a 
native born citi zen domiciled elsewhere would have , and no o th~rs .... The 
position that a c itizen carries with him. into ~very Sta te in to which he may 
go, the legal institutions of the one in which he was bom c<mnot be support· 
ed.'' 
in Rankin v. Lydia, 9 Ky. (2 A.K. Marsh) 467 (1820) 24 years e;dier. The Kentucky Court, how-
ever, distinguished the seven years of r~sidence at issue in Rankin from the temporary visit at 
issue in Strader. See Tom Davis, (of color), v. Tingle, 47 Ky. (8 B. Mon.) 539 (1848) (freedom 
vested where slave lived in Ohio long enough to establish domicile). 
The theme recurred in Taney's opinion in Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393, 450 (1856) 
(holding that effect of Scan's Illinois residency was to be determined by the laws of Missouri and 
giving effect to Missouri's refusal to recognize the freedom cor.ferred by Tilinois). Justice Nelson's 
concurring opinion set forth at greater length t.'1e proposition that just as the free states could 
exercise "complete and absolute powe r over" the status of individuals within u'leir boundaries to 
free slaves, the "sovereign character of the States of L'le Union" gave Missouri authority to decide 
whether or not to recognize the freedom granted by the laws of Missouri when Dred Scon crossed 
its borders. !d. at 458-67. 
For other cases denying recognition to liberty granted by free states, see, e.g. , Mitchell v. 
Weils, 37 Miss. 235 ( 1859) (re fusing to recognize New York manumission for estate administra· 
tion purposes even LfJough former slave was New York residen t); Liza v. Pu issant, 7 La. Ann. 80, 
8 1-83 (1852) ("It rests with each state to establ ish and regulate che domestic relations of its inhab-
itants. A state may prohib it slavery wit..'1in its limits bu t this imposes no obligation on oL'ler states 
to hold the conditions of persons domiciled there as extingui shed by reason of a presence in the 
State to which the relation is not recognized."). 
21. The earliest of these cases, Commonwealth v. Aves, 35 ;viass. (18 Pick.) 193 (1836), 
held that by entering Massachusens, a Louisiana master and slave became "subject to all its mu· 
nicipal laws" and hence "entitled [only] to the privileges wh ich those laws confer." The master 
was, therefore, not entitled to assert dominion over the slave . See, e.g. , Jackson v. Bulloch, 12 
Conn. 38 (1837) (freeing slave of sojourning sluve-owner); Anderson v. Poindexter, 6 Ohi o 623, 
63 1 (1856) ("Kentucky can not, by L'1e law of comity, demand oi this state an abrogation of its 
constitution and municipal laws, to promme any of its own ;x:cu!iar institutions ... nor can Ohio 
make any such demand of Kentucky."). 
22. 20 N.Y. 562 (1860). 
23. /d. at 607 (1860) . 
24. !d. at 608-09. Cf id. at 598-99 (?.rgument by counsel that recogn.ition of foreign status is 
limited by municipal law, and analogizing re fusal to recognize incestuous or polygamous marriag-
es lawful in a foreign domicile). 
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Considerations of comir; might counsel m favor of recognizing status 
extraterritorially, but the fin al decision in cases of moral conflict rested 
with the domestic polir;. 
Like the comity accorded to free or slave status before the Civil 
War, the black letter rule of extraterritorial marriage recognition, after 
all , has an exception for marriages that are antithetical to strong local 
policy ,25 and in cases of strong moral dissensus, the authority of local 
polities has been vindicated in the past. 25 
After the Civil War, the most dra.iuatic example of interstate moral 
conflict spawned by the tragic history of American slavery suggests 
again that doctrines of comity 'Nould not be sufficient to require an un-
wi lling state to recognize foreign same-sex. marriages. In the era before 
Loving v. Virginia, some states which prohibited interracial marriages 
recognized such marriages if contracted in a pennissive jurisdiction. 
But another line of authority took advan tage of the standc.rd confl icts 
doctrine to refuse such recognition either on the basis of explicit statu-
tory direction, or the court's perception of public policy. 27 Indeed, 
25. See, e.g., REsTATEMENT (SECOND) CON"rLICT OF LAWS§ 283(2) and cmt. k (1 971) (stat-
ing that the validity of a marriage which is val id where celebrated can be defeated by "the strong 
public policy of another state which had the most significant relationship to the spouses and the 
marriage at the time of the marriage"); JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON CONFLICT OF LAWS 
§ 131. 
26. The Uniform Marriage Evasion Act is testimony to one set of effof'.s to preclude 
domiciliaries from taking advantage of looser foreign laws; common law conflicts cases have 
similarly vindicated local policy on occasion. See e.g ., Williams v. Oates , 27 N.C. 535 (1845) 
(refusing to recognize extraterritorial marriage by state domiciliary contracted after divorce); State 
v. Fenn, 47 Wash. 561 (1907) (refusing the same). 
27. Cases refusing to accord recognition rested on two sets of arguments: 
I ) Each state has sovereign power to refuse to ali ow activ ities contravening its public 
policy wi thin its jurisdiction, and cohabitation in interracial marriages violates "public policy and 
good morals." See, e.g., State v. Bell, 7 Tenn. 7, 8 (1872) (interracial marriage celebrated by out 
of state domici!iaries who move into Tennessee); State v. Tuny, 4 1 F. 753 (S.D. Ga. 1890) (up-
holding Georgia fornication conviction of interrac ial couple married in District of Columbia); 
Kinney v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. (30 Gran) 858 (1878) (pol icy against "unnatural alliances" 
between races was "one upon which social order, public morality and the best interests of both 
races depend"); In re Takahashi's Estate, 129 ? .2d 217, 220 (Mont. 1942) (stating the "rule of 
comity does not require that a state shall sanction within its own borders that which is repugnant 
to its own law."); Succession of Gabisso, 44 So. 438, 441 (La. 1907) (Marriage contracted "in 
contravention of public policy and good morals" in another state is an "absolute nullity."); see 
Toler v. Oa.l.:wood Smokeless Coal Corp., 173 Va. 425 (1939) (West Virginia marriage celebrated 
under the assumption that previous husband was dead, valid in West Virginia, held void in Virgin-
ia , because of statutory mandate, dictum: same rule applies to interracial marriages); Jackson v. 
Jackson, 82 Md. 17 , 30 (1896) (dictum) (interracial marriages prohibi ted by statute are "absolutely 
void here" though "valid elsewhere"). 
2) The state of domicile has the power to prevent evasion by its domiciliaries of its laws 
regarding marriage val idity, see, e.g., Grecnhow v. James, 80 Va. 636 (1 885); State v. Kennedy, 
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Mildred Jeter and Richard Loving, the protagonists in Loving v. Virgin-
ia,28 were an interracial Virginia couple whose marriage in the District 
of Columbia led to their prosecution upon their return home. They 
were remitted to ti-Je Equal Protection Clause by the failure of interstate 
comity. 
In. FULL FA1TH AND CREDIT AND NATIONAL UNION 
The general doctrines of comity, of course, do not function unaid-
ed, for the constitution obligates states to grant "full faith and credit" to 
the public acts and judgments of the oL1er states in the Union. It was 
precisely to provide the acts and judgments of the states of the new 
republic with more recognition than the comity afforded to foreign 
nations that Article IV was drafted.29 The question, however, is wheth-
er "full faith and credit" adds binding power to the arguments for ex-
traterritorial recognition of same sex marriages. 
A. Status, Article IV and Choice of Law 
As I noted earlier, the understanding of the founding generation 
was that full faith and credit did not require extraterritorial recognition 
of a personal law of status acquired in one state when a resident trav-
76 N.C. 232 (1877) (interracial marriage between North Carolina domiciliaries celebrated in SouL'J 
Carolina held void, although a contemporaneous case recognized a marriage contracted among 
South Carolina domiciliaries. "A law like this of course would be very idle if it could be avoided 
by merely stepping over an imaginary line."); Dupre v. The Executor of Boulard, 10 La. Ann. 
411, 412 (1855) (refusing to recognize extraterritorial interracial marriage for purposes of estate 
administration in order to avoid "evasion of the Jaws"); Kinney v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. (30 
Gratt.) 858, 866 (1878) (to recognize extraterritorial marriages would allow "both races" by "step-
ping across an imaginary line, to bid defiance to the law"); Stevens v. United Sates, 146 F.2d 120, 
123 (lOth Cir. 1944) (Oklahoma domiciliaries "cannot elude" prohibition of interracial marriage 
by marriage in Kansas); Eggers v. Olson, 231 P. 483, 485 (Okla. 1924) (holding that Oklahoma 
residents could not evade prohibition of interracial marriage by extraterritorial celebration). 
28. 388 U.S. I (1967). The Loving's predecessors in the Supreme Court, Han Say Nairn and 
Ruby Nairn were Virginia residents who had been married in North Carolina in an effort to evade 
Virginia's prohibition. See Nairn v. Nairn, 197 Va. 734 (1956). 
29. See Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co. 296 U.S. 268, 276-77 (1935) ("The very pur-
pose of the full faith and credit clause was to alter the status of the several states as independent 
foreign sovereignties, each free to ignore obligations created under the laws or by the judicial 
proceedings of others, and to make them integral parts of a single nation .... "); Cf 2 ~X 
FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL Convention of 1787 488 (rev. ed. 1937) ("Mr. Wilson 
remarked, that if LlJe Legislature were not allowed to declare the effect the provision would 
amount to nothing more than what now takes place among all Independent Nations."). In Sun Oil 
Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 723 (1988), Justice Scalia reads this comment to suggest that in 
the absence of Congressional action, the Framers intended the Full Faith and Credit Clause to "be 
interpreted against the background of' rules of international comity. 
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elect to another. If it had, u'"le Fugitive Slave Clause's prohibition of 
"discharge from service" by " law or regulation" would have been un-
necessary. Indeed, where the slave-owners sought to invoke the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause to protect the bonds established by slave states 
against interference when a slave legitimately reached free soil, such 
efforts were unsuccessful.30 
In the aftermath of the Civil War, the Court regularly denied r~hat 
t'1e Constitution permitted, much less requi red the extraterritorial effect 
of state authmity. 31 Tne Full Faith and Credit Clause did not r~qu irc 
other states to recognize extraterritorial effect as a matter of defe~-c:nce 
to state sovereignty32 and the 1-"'rivileges and Immunities Ciause did 
not mandate it as a matter of individual right. The tone is captt:red by 
the reaction of the Court to th-~ claim t.~at a corporate charter could 
claim extraterritorial recognition as of right: " If ... the provision [s] of 
the Constitution could be construed to secure to citizens of each State 
in u1e other States the peculiar privileges conferred by their iaws, an 
extra-territorial operation would [thus] be given to local legislation 
utterly destmctive of the independence and the harmony of t..1e 
States."33 Given this construction of the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause, it is not surprising that the full faith and credit claims raised on 
behalf of extraterritorial recognition of interracial marriages were simi-
larly unsuccessful. 34 Loving v. Virginia, after all, was analyzed as an 
30. See e.g., Anderson v. Poindexter, 6 Ohio St. 622, 631 (1856) ("Kentucky cannot, by the 
law of comity, demand of !Pis state an abrogation of its constitution and municipal laws, to pro-
mote any of irs own peculiar i:1stitutions ... nor can Ohio make any such demand of Kentucky."). 
But cf id. at 675 (Bartley, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that full faith and credit requires recognition 
of slave status in transit). 
ln Lemmon v. People, 20 N.Y. 562 (1 860) the only constitutional challenge wrich the 
court felt worthy of reply was the claim that tl1e national unity established by the Privileges and 
lmmuni ties Clause was impugned by New York's refusal of a right of transit. The parties had 
engaged in a desultory discussion of t!1e obligation of full faith and credit, see e.g., id. at 590, but 
none seemed to view the obl igation as a bar to New York 's exerci se of its authority within its 
own boundaries. Two judges, Denio, J., id. at 604, and Wright, J. id. at 623, observed that the 
Fugitive Slave Clause was necessary only because in irs absence states would be entitled to grunt 
freedom to slaves crossing their borders. 
31. See, e.g., Pennoyer v. Neff. 95 U.S. 714 (1878); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 
(1897). 
32. See, e.g., Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657 (1892). 
33. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 181 (1868), questioned on other grounds, Western & 
Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S . 648 (1981). 
34. E.g. Ex Parte Kinney, 14 F.Cas. 602 (E.D. Va. 1879); cf Toler v. Oabvood Smokeless 
Coal Corp. , 173 Va. 425 (1939) (West Virginia marriage celebrated under the assumption that 
previous husband was dead, valid in West Virginia, held void in Virginia, despite full faith and 
credit claim, (dictum); same rule applies to interracial marriages). 
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equal protection and substantive due process case , not a c1a1m to full 
fa ith and credit for the Lovings' District of Columbia marriage. 
l\liuch of this analysis is adrnittedly contained in old cases, a..YJd a 
series of revoiutions in choice of law and constitutional analysis have 
occurred since those cases were decided. However, the core of the Su-
preme Court' s modem analysis of iJlterstate conflicts law seems at least 
as i11.hospi table to recognition of Hawaiian same sex marriages in the 
face of legislative hostility on the pait of the receiving state. The most 
recent authoritative formul ation of the obligations of faith and credit 
outside of the realm of judicial decrees holds that the "modest restric-
tions" of Article IV require that in order to impose its own law a state 
must "have a significant contact or signific<U1t aggregation of contacts 
such that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally un-
fair."35 V/hatever else one might say about a state which refuses to 
recognize a marriage celebrated extraterritorially by its domic iliari~s. it 
is hard to claim that the state lacks significant contacts with the couple 
it is attempting to sunder, or that there is a..11y unfair surprise in the 
attempt to assert jurisdiction.36 
B. Migratory Divorce and "Domicile" 
What, then, of the possibility of looking to the more robust full 
faith and credit granted to judgments of other states?37 The problem of 
recognition of judgments does not figure prominently in the legacy of 
race relations, but in litigation over the moral dissensus surrounding 
35. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818 (1985) (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. 
Hague, 449 U.S. 302,312-13 (1 98 1) (plurality opinion)). 
Shutts also cited LIJe Hague dissent for the proposition that the Full Fai th and Credit Clause re-
quirement of respect for the laws of other states is "subject to the forum's own interest in further-
ing its public pol icy." !d. at 819. 
Subsequently in Sun Oi l v. Woruna..'l, 486 U.S. 717 (1988), justice Scalia advanced the more 
controversial rule that a "subsisting trJdition" of confl ict mles was per se valid under fu ll fai th 
and credit analysis. !d. at 728 n.2. 
36. Professor Koppleman suggests in his article Same Sex Marriag e and Public Policy: The 
Miscegenation Precedents, 16 QUTNNIPI AC L REV. I 05 (1996), that the courts of a state which is 
nei!.he r the present or past domicile of same sex Hawaiia.:1 marital partners would violate constitu-
tional choice of law constraints if it fai led to recognize the marital status of litigants before it. 
This might be true if the forum 's connection with the li tigants and transaction were so slight as to 
render its choi..:e of its own hostile law arbitrary; and there may be symbolic effect to be gained 
by strategically engineering such sui ts. But this approach offers relatively little short-tenn so lace 
to couples who seek to import Hawaiian marriages to their ovm Ccmicile, or even Hawaiian cou-
ples who seek to migrate after establishing Hawaiian domicile. 
37 . See, e.g., Underwriters Nat'! Assurance Co. v. North Carolina Life & Accident& Health 
Ins . Guar. Assn. , 455 U.S. 691 (1982); Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S . 287, 293 (1942); 
Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S . 230 (1908). 
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divorce the issue of full faith and credit to judgments is central. The 
most recent tum of the doctrine could provide a basis for recognition 
of Hawaii' s same-sex marriages. 
In the era following World War TI, the Supreme Court interpreted 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause to obligate states to recognize at least 
some extraterritorial changes in marital status antitlu:tical to their local 
law. Thus, in Williams v. North Carolina ,38 the Court L::ld that full 
fa ith and credit would preclude North Carolina 's b lga:r:ry prosecution 
for marital cohabitation after an ex parte divorce and f:::r~l3E1<•.ge l.ll 
Nevada if the part ies' t\vo month sojourn in Nevad <J. est<tbli.shed '·'domi -
ci!e ."39 So, too, in Sherrer v. Sherrer,4D the Court required l\1s.ssaci:.u-
setts to recognize a contested Florida divorce of a resident of rihssa-
chusetts who migrated to F1orida for a year and returned to Massachu-
serts two months after her divorce and remarriage, in the ~eeth o:f a 
Massachusetts statute precluding recognition. Justice Frankfurter ' s 
dissent complained that the result permitted "the States with the la".est 
divorce laws to impose their policies upon all other States ."41 In re-
sponse, while recognizing "the importance of a State' s power to deter-
mine the incidents of basic social relationships into which its 
domiciliaries enter," the Court determined that: 
L'1e full faith and credit clause is one of the provisions incorporated into the 
Constitution by its framers for the purpose of transforming an aggregation of 
independent sovereign states into a nation. If in its application, local pol icy 
must at times be required to give way, such is part of u'1e price of our federal 
sy stem.'~ 
Thus, even a strongly held policy preference was not grounds for fai l-
ing to grant full faith and credit to a litigated judgment. 
38. 3i7 U.S. 287 (1942). 
39. After a second trial , the Supreme Court upheld the prosecution because of a determi-
nation !hat Nevada domicile had not been established. See Williams v. Nort.'1 Carolina, 325 U.S. 
226 (1945). 
40. 334 U.S. 343 (1948). 
4 1. !d. at 366. More colorfully, he worried that the opinion would "endow with canstitu-
tional sanctity a Gresham's Law of domestic relations." !d. at 367. 
42. !d. at 355. See Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S. 378 (1948) (requiring Massachuse tts to recognize 
Nevada divorce granted after four months of residence to husband who later returned to Massa-
chusetts); see also Cook v. Cook, 342 U.S. 126 (1951) (requiring Vermont to recognize Florida 
divorce obtained by Virginia resident after sojourn in Florida); Johnson v.Muelberger, 340 U.S. 
581 (1951) (requiring New York to recognize contested Florida divorce of New York resident, de-
spite the fact that in collateral anack it was shown that the Florida ninety day residency require-
ment had not been met). 
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An effort to use these cases as a wedge for recogmt10n of 
Hawaii's same-sex marriages, however, faces substantial difficulties. 
The migratory divorce cases began with the premise that " [e]ach state 
as a sovereign has a rightful and legitimate concern in u'1e marital sta-
tus of persons domiciled within its borders,"43 &'1d u'lat once reduced 
to judgment, decrees exercising that power over domiciliaries are ""val-
id throughout the \m ion."44 There are thus two initial technical prob-
lems 1;vith atternp~i·ng to apply these cases to the prospect of ~~migratory 
same-sex Inan~iagf;s"-or indeed) any evasionary rnarriage. 
First, the power w determine marital sta tus in the migratory di-
vorce cases is lirr:ited to domiciliaries; even the quickest of "quickie" 
:Nevada divorces required a six week residency and a declaration of 
dorr1iciliary intent. 45 For Pennsylvania residen ts seeking to import a 
Hawaii marriage after a Hawaiian honeymoon there is 1ikely to be at 
least substantial debate about the relevant "domicile." Parties to con-
tested extraterritorial d ivorces and their privies have been held to be 
bound to implausible findings about transient "domiciles," but many of 
the legal effects sought by same-sex mar--ital partners-such as tax 
status and social welfare benefits- will involve a hostile home state 
which is hardly a pm"Tj to the marTiage.46 Just as North Carolina suc-
cessfully contested the jurisdiction of Nevada to divorce the subjects of 
its bigamy prosecution in Williams v. North Carolina,47 we can expect 
hostile states to contest vigorously Hawaii's jurisdiction to establish the 
marital status of domiciliaries who return to seek tax or social welfare 
benefits from their original home state. 
Second, the extraterritorial divorce cases take advantage of the 
powerful full faith and credit extended to litigated final judgments, and 
43. \Villiams '!. North Carolina, 317 U.S. at 298. 
44. ld. at 301. 
45. At one point, Ura.,'1 went even further, asserting jurisdiction to divorce couples where one 
member "wished to bece>me" a Utah resident. See NELSON BLAKE, THE RoAD TO Reno 122 
(1962); Richard J. Aaron, Mormon Divorce and the Statute of 1852: Questions for Divorce in the 
1980's, 8 J.CONTEMP. L. 5, 23-26 (1982). Where neither of the parties was a Utah resident, how-
ever, the divorces were vulnerable to attack in other jurisdictions. See Hood v. State, 56 Ind. 263 
(1877) (viewing Utah divorce of non-resident as assault on the sovereignty of neighboring states); 
State v. Armington, 25 Minn. 29 (1878) (refusing to recognize Utah divorce of two Minnesota 
residents); Hardy v. Smith, 136 Mass. 328 (1884) (refusing to recognize Utah divorce of two 
Massachusetts residents). 
46. Cf REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFL!Cf OF Laws, § 74 cmt. b (1971) (denying juris-
diction via third party estoppel "has no relevance to the question whether a state may prosecute 
for bigarny, or for unlawful cohabitation, a person who has obtained a divorce in a state which 
had no judicial jurisdiction to grant it"). 
47. 325 U.S. 226 (1945). 
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it is far from clear that then issuance of marriage certificates ca.n be 
regarded as a judgment. These obstacles could conceivably be over-
come by sufficiently creative transient couples and a sufficient ly sym-
pathetic Hawaii judiciary seeking to generate judgments binding on the 
receiving state.48 But a determined receiving state is not without gam-
bits of its own.49 
48 . Assuming a coopcratjve Hawali judicial systr:.: m. 3.i1 r!xpcd!reJ declaratory judgment ac-
tion agair.st the partners' horne sta te seeking a declarati on of n;3.ritai :;t.·uus and Hawaiian domicile 
could arguably serve the purpose . In an earlier era, Profc:: :~o r Ehren~wc ig suggested that deciarato-
ry judgment~ entered in more liberal states could establish the mJ..rital status of interracial couples 
who sought to enter states with miscegenation prohibitions. Aleen A. Ehrenzweig, Miscegenation 
in tr.e Cor.jlict of Laws: Law and Reason Versus the Reswtemem Second, 45 CORNELL L. Q. 659, 
662 (1960). 
Assuming the home state "does business" in Hawaii sufficient to grant personal jurisdic-
tion cf Nevada v. Hall, 44D U.S. 4 10 (1979), in t.he f3ce of a srrearn of Pennsyivania residents 
seeking to establish Hawaii marriages, Pennsylvania would be faced with the prospect of either 
f>J.ri_ng permanent local counse l to contest the issue of domicile or acceding to Hawaii 's marital 
judgments . 
49. Opponents of same-sex marriage at the federal level, moreover, have not ignored the fact 
that the majestic generality of the Full Faith and Credit Clause is followed by a delegation to 
Congress of authority "by general Laws [to] prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records 
and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof." U.S. CONST. art IV, § L The so-called 
"Defense of Marriage Act" provides that no state shall "be required to give effect" to a foreign 
law or judgment " respecting a re lationship between persons of the same-sex that is treated as a 
marriage." Act of Sept 21, 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat 2419) (to be 
codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738C). 
Professor Tribe is on record proposing that the enforcement clause "includes no congres-
sional power to prescribe that some acts, records and proceedings that would otherwise be entitled 
to full faith and credit under the Full Faith and Credit Clause as judicially interpreted shall instead 
be entitled to no faith or credit at all." 142 CoNG. R.Ec . 55931-32 (da.ily cd. June 6, 1996) (letter 
by Professor Laurence H. Tribe to Senator Edward M. Kennedy). 
Professor Tribe's position is in some tension with a line of dicta suggesting that the Su-
preme Coun would welcome and defer to Congressional action delineating the reach of the full 
faith and credit obligation. See e.g ., Sun Oil Co. v. Woru-nan , 486 U.S. 717, 728 (1988) (suggest-
ing that Congress could designate particular issues as "substantive" for choice of law purposes); 
Williams v. North Carol ina, 325 U.S. 226 , 266 (!945) (B:ack, J., dissen ting); Sherrer v. Sherrer, 
334 U.S. 343, 352 n.I S (1948) (alluding to Congress ional power to legislate); id. at 364 n.l3 
(Frankfurter, d issenting) (suggesting that Congress could alter full faith and credit accorded to 
divorce decrees); Yarborough v . Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202, 2 15 n.2 (1933) (Stone, J., dissenting) 
(expanding or contracting clause at the direction of Congress); Robert H. Jackson , Full Faith and 
Credi!-the Lawyer's Clause of the Consritution, 45 COLUM. L. REv. I, 21-24 (1945). 
Some legislative history likewise points to a co-equal role for Congress in delineating the 
reach of the full faith and credit obligation. Madison claimed (Federalist No. 42, at 387) that the 
unadorned full faith and credit obligation inherited from the Articles of Confederation was "ex-
tremely indeterminate," and Congressional power to prescribe effect constitu ted an "evident and 
valuable improvement ... . " THE FEDERALIST No. 42 (James Madison). See 2 MAx FARRAND, 
THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 488-89 (rev. ed. 1937) ("Doer. Johnson 
thought the amendment as worded would authorize the General Legislature to declare the effect of 
the Legislative acts of one state , in anoL'Jer state."); Dougla> Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equ<J! 
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Assuming for the moment that a receiving state is required to 
recognize same-sex ma:Tiages as "marriages" when the couple enters its 
borders, it can still seek to exercise its own sovereign authority over 
vvh at follows from that status in two ways. First, just as the legal mech-
anism of divisible divorce-in which states treated some legal incidents 
of marital dissolution as following from an ex parte extraterritorial di-
vorce, while denying others-followed from migratory divorce,50 it is 
not diffic ult to imagine a state which is obliged to recognize same sex 
n·; 3.1Tiages as "marriages" responding by divid i_ng the perquisi tes of 
;n ;;;;.-; iages and vesting the more appealing ones in heterosexual un-
icns.51 
Second, a.t'ld more importantly, a hostile receiving state, even if 
ini tially compelled to recognize an extraterritorial marriage , can invoke 
its own authority over its new domiciliaries prospectively . A sufficient-
ly i;1transigent receiving state could statutorily decree "divorce" for 
s2.1ne sex couples who choose ultimately to come to reside in within its 
borders. To be sure, legislative divorce is no longer the nonn,52 but 
the 19th century precedent upholding legislative divorce against due 
process attack has been regularly cited as good evidence of the authori-
tY of states over marriage within their boundari~s.53 
and Territorial States: The Constitutionnl Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 
297 -98 (1992) (arguing that omission of language in prior draft that "operation shall be binding in 
other states, in all cases to which it may relate, and which acts are within the cognizance and 
jurisdic tion of the State ... " implied that the final clause "presupposed choice-of-law rules and 
left detailed specifications of those rules to the courts or to Congress"). 
The bener attack, it seems to me, is a claim that the Defense of Marriage Act is not the 
type of "general"' law contemplated by the constitutional text, perhaps bolstered by a reference to 
the equ<!.l protection princ iples of Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996) . 
SO. See, e.g. , Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416 (1957) (recognizing Nevada divorce as 
tem1inating marriage but not obligation of support); Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948) (holding 
that a Nevada divorce binds the world as to bigamy and bastardy, but not support); Kreiger v. 
Kre iger, 334 U.S. 555 (194S); Hudson v. Hudson, 53 Cal. 2d 735 (extraterritorial divorce did not 
affec l ob ligation of support). 
51. Cf State v. Bell, 66 Tenn. 9 ( 1872) (prohibiting cohabitation of interracial couple lawful-
ly married out of state). 
Such reservations of perqui sites for heterosexual unions would, of course , be subject to 
chal lenge under the equal protection clause. But if Romer v. Evans does not prohibit states from 
refusing to perform same-sex marriages generally , it is not clear why it should prohibit imposing 
second class status on such marriages as L1e state is compelled to recognize. 
52. Indeed, it is prohibited by a number of state constitutions. See NELSON BLAKE, THE 
ROAD TO RENO 56 (1962) (reporting that by 1867, at least 33 state constitutions specifically pro-
hi bi ted legislative divorce). 
53. See Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888) (approving Oregon legislative divorce without 
notice to wife where husband had immigrated to Oregon, wife had remained in Ohio); Williams v. 
North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 296 ( 1942) (citing Maynnrd). While the Oregon legislature acted at 
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If there is a constitutional obstacle to these responses, it does not 
flow from the Full Faith and Credit Clause or the structure of the Un-
ion. Depending on where the Court ultimately comes to rest on the 
equal protection rights of gays and lesbians, such gambits might be 
subject to challenge under the rather murky principles of Romer v. Ev-
ans. But such attacks put the rabbit into the hat. If a refusal to recog-
nize fully or an effort to dissolve sa.'!le-sex marriages celebrated in 
other states is an invidious denial of equal protection, it is hard to see 
why the initial decision to deny access to matrimony domestically is 
not equally invidious. In any event, such attacks are addressed at great-
er length by others. I want to explore another line of analysis which 
could facilitate recognition of some same sex couples as families even 
if the federal courts do not establish discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation as constitutionally invidious. 
IV. A MODEST PROPOSAL 
A. The Rights of Travel and Migration 
The United States was established with a heritage of free interstate 
travel and migration. The Articles of Confederation provided protection 
for "free ingress and regress to and from any other state."54 Although 
the explicit textual protection did not survive in haec verba in the Con-
stitution, from early in the country's history, courts have recognized the 
right to travel among the states of the union as one of the privileges 
and immunities of national citizenship under Article IV, and the facility 
the request of the husband in Maynard, the divorce was imposed against the will of the wife, and 
there was no suggestion in the opinion that an involuntary annulment would not have been equally 
within the legislative power. 
Although Justice Curtis , di ssenting in Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393, 599 (1856) (Curtis, J., 
dissenting), had suggested that abrogation of a marriage upon immigration would violate the con-
stitutional prohibition on impairments of contracts, the Court specifically rejected the claim that 
marital unions can invoke conrract clause protection. Maynard, 125 U.S. 287 (1 888); Hunt v. 
Hunt, 131 U.S. App. clxv (1 879). See also Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 
517, 628 (1819) (Conrract clause "never has been unders tood to restrict the general right of the 
legislature to legislate upon the subject of divorces."). 
!d. 
54. Article rv of the Articles of Confederation provided: 
The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the people 
of the different States in this Union, the free inhabitants of each of these States, pau-
pers, vagabonds and fugitives from justice excepted, shall be entitled to all privileges 
and immunities of free citizens in the several States; and the people of each State shall 
have free ingress and regress to and from any other State ... . 
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of interstate migration has become a staple of our natio;:al identity .55 
Indeed, it was precisely the proposition that African Americans recog-
nized as citizens ifl a free state would have the right to reb.i.n that sta-
tus when traveling in slave states that impelled Justice Ta_ney i.n Dred 
Scott v. Sandford to reject so forcefully the possibility of citizenship for 
the descendants c.f slaves.56 
The revers<2l of Dred Scott by L'1e birthright citizenship and the 
Privileges and In;__rnunities Clauses of the Fourteenth .r\.rr~ ~:ndrnent guar-
anteed that A..fric:m 1\mericans, like other citizens, wert c~)r;sti ·~uttonally 
entitled to travel arf!ong the states. The citizenship clcu2:~=:: Gf the Four-
teent.il Amendment -.;vas intended to overrule Dred 3cut:,57 and over-
tum u'1e regime under which states excluded free blacks a.nd abolition-
ists.58 By granting birthright citizenship in the nation &J1d residency-
based citizenship in the states, the Framers of t'le Fourteenth A.mend-
ment insured that the right to travel between states could no longer be 
denied to blacks or other disfavored residents because they were not 
"citizens."59 By prohibiting state abridgment of the privileges and im-
------------ ·-------------·-····---------
55. In Corfield v. Coryell , 6 F. Cas. 546, 552 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230), Justice 
Washington had identified LI-te "right of a citizen of one state to pass through, or to reside in other 
state, for purposes of trade, agricu lture, professional pursuits, or otherwise ... '" as one of the 
privileges and immunities protected by Article IV of the Constitution. See United States v. 
Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281, 297-98 ("Undoubtedly the right of citizens of the Scates to reside peace-
fully in. and to have free ingress into and egress from the several states [against both their own 
and other states] ... .'"fused into one by Article IV Section 2); Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 
Wall.) 418, 430 (1870) ("the clause plainly and unmistakably secures and protects the right of a 
citizen of one State to pass into any other State of the Union for L'le purpose of engaging in law-
ful commerce, trade, or business without molestation .. .. "); Paul v. Virginia. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 
168, 180 (1869) (Privileges and immunities clause "gives . .. [citizens of each sute] the right of 
free ingress into other States, a:1d egress from them."). 
56. Dred Scou. 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 416-417,23 (citizenship "would give .. . [them] the 
right to enter every other State whenever Ll-tey pleased .... "). 
57. See , e.g., Sugarman v . Dougall, 413 U.S. 634,652 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenti!lg). 
58. See, e.g .. CP.ESTER J. ANTIEAU, THE ORJG!NAL UNDERSTANDING Of THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT 33 (1981). Stating that: 
The denial of the opportunity to move freely throughout the land was one of il>e badg-
es of serv itude imposed on the slave ... and, in ratifying the Fourteenth .O..mend.:nent 
the people intended that the privileges and immunities clause of that Amendment 
would protect Blacks, as well as Whites, in their freedom to move and travel around 
the country. without restriction by LIJe States and their political subdivisions. 
See also, e.g., PAUL FlNKLEMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION 342-43 (1981). S\ating that 
In making the freedmen citizens of the states in which they resided, the amend-
ment .. . required that the individual states recognize the rights of citizenship and 
therefore grant comity to blacks entering from other states. No longer could a southern 
state imprison a free black sai lor from the North or indeed, prohibit free blacks from 
entering their domain. 
59. It was clear to all concerned LIJat LIJe status of citizenship would entail a right to inter-
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munities of citizenship, the Fourteenth Amendment provided an explicit 
federal protection for interstate travel and migration. 
Thus, u'1e Court was on solid historical ground in the Slaughter-
f{ouse Cases6D when it announced that the right to interstate travel 
was a " privilege a11d immunity" of national citi zenship protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment.61 The Court further recognized that the Four-
teenth Amendment established the national privilege that "a citizen of 
the United States can , by his own volition, become a c itizen of any 
Stz. te of the Union by a bona fide residence therein, with the: same 
eights .1s oth :~~ l· citizens of that state." 62 
Since tbe Slaughter-House Cases, the Court has viewed the righr 
to rn igrate as an essential pm1 of the federal structure .63 ,t..,s Justice 
statr:: trav~ l &id migration. In response to t.~c amendment introducing L1e citizenship provisions of 
the Fourtl!enth Amendment on the floor of the Senate on May 30, 1866, Sena tor Cowan of Penn-
sylvani8. observed: 
[a]s I underst;md the rights of the States under the constitution at present, California 
has the right, if she deems it proper, to forbid the entrance into her territory of any 
person she chooses who is not a citizen of some one of the United States . She cannot 
forbid [a citizen's] entrance .... 
CONG. GLOBE, 29th Cong., 1st Sess 2891 (1866). 
Cou;an argued against the amendment because he was "unwilling, on the part of my State to give 
up the right . .. of expelling ... " Gypsies. /d. 
A similar understanding was articulated in debate on the citizenship provisions of the 1866 
C ivil Rights Bill. See e .g. id at 1757 (Sen. Trumbull) ("Inherent, fundamental rights which belong 
to free citizens" include the right "to go into any Sate of the Union and to reside there and the 
United Sates Government will protected him in that right"). 
60. 33 U.S . (1 6 Wall.) 36, 79-80 (1873) 
61. !d. 
62. ld. at 80. See also id. at 112-13 (Bradley, J ., dissenting) ("A citizen of the United States 
has a perfect constitutional right to go and reside in any State he chooses . .. and a11 equality of 
rights wirJ1 every other citizen; and the whole power of the nation is pledged to sustain him ir1 that 
l-ight.") . 
63. Se~ Zobel •;. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 67 (1982) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("unquestioned 
hi st0ric recogni tion of the principle of free interstate migration" finds " its unmistakable e sse nc~ in 
Lhat document that transformed a loose confederation of states into one Nation."); Dunn v. 
Biu msie in , 405 U.S. 330, 338 (1972) (right to travel is "fundamental personal right"); Griffin v. 
Breckenridge, ,103 U.S. 88, 106 (1971) ("right to pass freely from State to State" protected by 
Constitution, al th•)ugh it does not necessarily rest on the Fourteenth Amendment); Shapiro v. 
Thompson, 394 U.S. 6 18, 629 (1 969) ("This Court long ago recognized that the nature of our 
Federal Union and our constitutiona l 'concepts ' of personal liberty unite to require !.hat all citizens 
be fr~e to ·travel throughout the length and breadth of our land .... "); United States v. Guest, 383 
U.S. 745, 758 (1966) ("a right so elementary was conceived from the beginning to be [a] neces-
Sill)' concomiL'l.'ll of a stronger union ... . "); !d. at 767 (opinion of Harlan, j_) (" [T]he right to 
unimpeded interstate travel, regarded as privilege and immunity of national citizenship, was hiswr-
ica!ly seen as a me thod of breaJr...ing down state provincialism, and facilitatin g the creation of a 
true federal union ."); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S . 160, 178 (1941) (Douglas, J., concmnng) 
("The ri ght to move freely fro m State to State is an incident of national ci tizenship .... "); !d. at 
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O'Connor commented: 
It is difficult to imagine a 1ight more essential to the Nation as a whole than 
the ri ght to establish residence in a new Stare. Just as our federal system 
permits the States to experimem with different sc-cial and economic pro-
grams . .. it allows the ind ividual to sertie in the State offering those pro-
g;-<:tms best tailored to his or her tastes.""' 
181 
As mernbers of this federal system, states are not entitled to discrimi-
ns.te against or deny nevv corfiers pobtlcal or econornic benefits on the 
basis of the exercise of their constitutional ri ght to migrate from a.'loth-
er state, or to penalize them for exercising that right. 65 
-v\ ith this background , at least for gay couples who have been 
marrie.::I as Hawaii domicilia,--ies, are there: constitutional objections to a 
system by which states other than Hawaii exact a forfe iture of marital 
status a.s the price of migration? Justice Black in Wi!liam.s v. North 
Carolina maintained that a rule allowing North Carolina to refuse to 
recognize a Nevada divorce in a domestic prosecution for bigamy was 
effectively a prosecution for exerc ising "their constitutional right to 
pass from a state in which they were validly married into another state 
which refuses to recognize their marriage. Such a consequence runs 
counter to the basic guarantees of our federal union.'166 And in the era 
before the Civil War, slaves freed in Northern states invoked the right 
to interstate travel as protection against u'1e imposition of Southern laws 
185 (Jackson, J., concurring) ("Rich or penniless, Duncan's citizenship under the Constitution 
p ledges his strength to the defense of California as a part of the United States and his right to 
migrate to any part of the land he mus t defend is something she must respect under the same 
ins011ment"); Will iams v. Fears, !79 U.S. 270, 274 (19CO) ("Undoubtedly the right . .. ordinarily, 
0f free transit from or through the territory of any State is ~ right secured by the Founeenth 
Ame ndment . .. "); Twining v. New Jersey , 211 U.S . 78, 97 ( 1908) ("right to pass freely from 
state to state" is a privilege of national citizenship); Pz.ul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. !68, 180 (1869) 
(Article r-1 gives citizens of each state "the right of free ingress into other States, and egress from 
them") quoted with approval in Hicklin v. Orbed:, 437 U.S . 518, 524 (1978) ; Baldwin v. Montana 
Fish aiJd Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 37i , 380 ( 1973); United States v. 'Nheeler, 254 U.S. 281,295 
(1 920); T ravis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 252 U.S. 60, 78 (1920); Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 
239, 250 ( i 898)) . 
64. Zobel, 457 U.S. at 76-77 (O'Connor, i ., concurring). 
65 . See Anorney General of New York v. Soto LDpez, 476 U.S . 898 (1986) (civil service 
preference); Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612 (1 985) (tax advantages); Zobel 
v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1 982) (payments from state oil royalties); Memorial Hospital v. 
Maricopa County, 4 15 U.S. 250 (1974) (medica! benefits); Dunn v. Blumstein , 405 U.S. 330 
( 1971) (voting); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (welfare benefits). 
Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975), pennined Iowa to defer the opportunity to obtain a 
divorce for one year after ta.IGng up res idency, though not to deny it entirely. 
66. Widiams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226,265 (1945) (Black, J. , di ssenting). 
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when they ventured south, even as slave-owners invoked the right to 
interstate travel to protect L~eir dominion over their slaves, established 
by the laws of their home states, against L'1terference from the laws of 
the states which they visited. 
Justice Black ' s claim, however, was voiced in dissent, and t.\)e 
often-rejected claims of t,i-)e slave-owners and freedmen never extended 
beyond claim for a right of pass;::.ge through hostile territory .67 In the 
general case I arn afraid a federal systerr1 which vests domestic re la-
tions power in the states me;ms precisely that migrants sacrifice legai 
advantages in their state of origin when they seek to exercise their 
rights to travel or migrate . 
The price of obtaining the ht~n efils of a new sta te citi zenship is 
leaving behind the benefits of che old. Even for visitors from other 
states, the Privileges and Immunities C lause of Article IV has long 
been interpreted only "to insure to a citizen of State A who ventures 
into State B the same priviieges which the citizens of State B en-
joy."68 "Special privileges enjoyed by citizens in their own States are 
not secured in other States . . . .'.n9 In more recent cases involving 
interstate migration, discriminatory denial of economic or political 
entitlements to newcomers where the same rights were granted to long 
time residents formed the gravamen of t.1e complaints. But if 
Pennsylvania's long-term resident cannot obtain the benefits of same-
sex marriage, there is no apparent discrimination against 3.1"1 immigrant 
from Hawaii who is subject to the same rule. 
B . The Right to Travel and Family Values 
The analysis tlms far treats the issue as a denial of legal 
entitlements as to which individuals migrating from Haw aii and Penn-
sylvania residents are similarly situated. The fact, however, is that an 
exercise of Pennsylvania' s authori ty to deny recognition to marriages of 
unconventional immigr3.1>ts as they cross its boundary involves more 
than a refusal to recognize an abstract legal capacity . For Hawaiiar:t 
emigrants, the denial of marital recognition mear!s rending a family 
bond which has already been established. If courts recognize u'1at the 
question is whether there is a righ t to migrate as an existing family, the 
67. The only case which came close to establishing a ri ght to permanently migrate was Jus-
tice Taney 's opinion in Dred Scolt, which is hardly a congenial precedent. 
68. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S . 385 , 395 (1 948) (c iting Paul, 75 U.S. at 180-81; Travis, 
252 U.S. at 78). Also quoied in Virginia v. Friedman, 487 U.S. 59, 64 (1988). 
69. Paul v. Virginia 75 U.S . 168, 180-81 ( !868) . 
1996] TER RITOR !ALlTY AND MORAL DiSSENSUS 183 
analysis dons a different aspect. We might call this the " fam ily values" 
approach. 
To put the strongest case, assume a same-sex couple who have 
raised children in Hawaii moves to Pennsylvania, and the biological 
parent dies. Would Pennsylvania be entitled to treat the children as 
wards of the state and L~e surviving spouse as a stra.'1ger to the children 
she has raised as a lawful parent in. Hawaii? There is certa iniy prece-
dent suggesting that a refusal to recognize a family unit in such cir-
cumstar:ces raises constitutional doubts . T t1e destruction of a long-
standing family uni t is an ev il that demands justification. The i:npc.si -
tion of that evil as a consequence of migration is in tension with ooth 
L~e mobility of national ci tizenship conferred by the Fourteenth 
Amendment and the federal structure, as well as the proposition that a 
state may not penalize the exercise of those rights. 
It is reasonably clear that tt'le effort to dismember an existing 
family initially recognized by domestic law would require justifications 
more substantial than a mere policy preference for alternative living ar-
rangements by the state.70 This constitutional protection is not iimited 
to families whose existence is initially sanctioned by law. In Stanley v. 
Illinois/ 1 the children of Joan and Peter Stanley, an unmarried couple 
who raised their children jointly for 18 years, were determined to be 
wards of the state upon the death of their mother. Tne state claimed 
70. See M.L.B. v. S.L.J. , 117 S. Ct. 555. 564-65 (1 996) ("Choices about marriage. family 
life, and the upbringing of cruldren are ... sheltered by the Fourteenth Amendment against the 
State' s unwarranted usurpation, di sregard or disrespect"; interest in retaining exis ting parent-cruld 
relationship is "commanding, indeed. far more precious than any property right.'") . Santosky v. 
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (requiring clear and convincing evidence for termination of parental 
rights). Cf Smith v. Org of Foster Farn iiies, 43 1 U.S . 816,862-63 (1977) (S tewart, J., concurring) 
("If the St:!te were to a ttempt to fo rce the breakup of a natural fam ily, over the objections of the 
paren ts and their children. without some showing of unfitness and for the sole reason that to do so 
was thought to be in the children ' s best interest, I should have lirJe doubt the State would have 
intruded impem1issibly .... ") quoted with approva l in Quilloin v. Wolcon. 434 U.S. 246 , 255 
(1978). Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 253 (1 983) ("[T)he relationship of love and duty in 3. 
recogn ized family unit is an interest in li berty entitled to constitutional protection."). 
ln some states, state constitutional guarantees provide additional protection. See, e.g .. 
Simmons v. Simmons, 900 S.W. 2d 682 (Tenn. 1995) (statutory anempt to impose grandparent 
visitation on adoptive family violates state constitution' s right to fami ly autonomy); Brooks v. 
Parkerson, 454 S.E.2d 769 (Ga. 1995) cerr. denied 116 S.Ct. 377 (1995) (statutory gra.'ldparents 
visitation statu te invalid under state constitution as applied to families where there is no threat of 
harm to the ch ild); Beagle v. Beagle, 678 So.2d 1271 (Fla. 1996) (quoting Beagle v. Beagle, 654 
So.2d 1260, 1263 (1 995) (Florida's constirutional protection of privacy inval idated statutory efforL~ 
impose grandparent vis itation over parental objections whether the child "lives in a loving, nurntr-
ing home wiL'l both parents, a loving home headed by a workillg mother whose erstwhile husband 
deserted the fami iy or with a loving faL'ler devastated by a divorce not of his asking."). 
7!. 405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
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that by defining the unmarried father-Peter, an Illinois resident-not 
to be a "parent," it could ignore the existing relationship between father 
and chi ldren. . TI1e Court, however, declared " the interest of a man in 
the children he has sired and raised undeniably warrants deference, and 
absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection." Justice 'v'lhite 
acknowledged that "famiiy relationships unlegitimized by a marriage 
ceremony . .. [invoive fam ily] bonds ... as warm, enduring, and 
important as those arising '>V ithin a more fom1ally organized f<:cmily 
unit.'m 
i\llr. Sta11!ey was entit led to invoke constitutional protection for his 
family on the basis of both his on-going care taldng relationship and 
biological bonds. Subsequent cases hold that biology is not sufficient to 
es tablish constitu tional protection for the parent-child relationship, but 
that the crucial element is fu li commitment to the responsibilities of 
parenthood.73 A father whose connections with his biological child are 
not solemnized by marriage, but who nonet.1-jeless "grasps the opportu-
nity" to develop a relationship with his children, and "accepts . .. 
responsibility for the child ' s future," is entitled to "enjoy the blessings 
of the parent-child relationship and make uniquely valuable contribu-
tions to the child's development."74 One whose relationship remains 
merely "potential," rather tJ1an "developed" can claim no constitutional 
protection. 75 
Certainly, in the case of same sex couples who have married a..-1d 
established families with children in Hawaii, the parent-child relation-
ships are as "wann, enduring and important" as those within a "devel-
oped" non-marital fam ily of different sexes. Indeed, L~e same sex par-
ents have sought legal recognition for the relationship by seeking the 
"protection . . . provided by the laws that authorize formal mar-
riage."76 Under existing iaw, a state that sought to ignore a biological 
par ent-child relationship because of hostility to the law under which 
72. ld. at 651-2. 
73. See e.g., Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 445-46 (1990) (opinion of St,evens, J., 
citing cases). 
74. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983); see also Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 
(1978) (denial of unmarried biological father ' s right to veto adoption did not violate constitution, 
where father had made no effort to establish relationship with children); Caban v. Mohammed, 
~Ai U.S. 380 (1979) (denial of unmarried biological father's right to veto adoption violated equal 
protection; father had establ ished relationship with children); id. at 397 (Stewart, J. dissenting) 
(constitutional protection requires "enduring relationships"); id. at 414 (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(developed relationship could warrant constitutional protection). 
75 . !d. 
76. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 263 . 
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marriage was solemllized would be on dubious consti tutional ground. 
The question is whether, in the absence of biological corL'1ections, the 
prior legal recognition of tJ1e fami ly unit in a11other state, combined 
with an on-going care taking relationship is sufficient \:o invoke consti-
tutional protection. 
One building block is Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for 
Equaiity and Reform,"17 where the Court "assumed;, L'1at foster par-
ents---who had no biological connection with the children en!:rusted to 
L~eh· ccie--cou1d invoke a protected liberty interest in the ongoiilg 
re1at ionsh1p~ Justice Brennan con1Jnented that: 
[T]he importance of the familial relationship, to u'-:e indi,;idua!s invoivc:d ar1d 
t·J the society, steins frorn the emotional attachrnt:nts Lil1t derive frorn the 
intimacy of daily association, and from the role it plays in 'p~omot[ing] a 
way of life' through the instruction of children . . . At least where a child has 
been placed in foster care as an infant ... and has remained continuously for 
several years in L'le care of the same fos ter parents, it is natural that the fos -
ter family should hold the same place in the emotional life of the foster 
child, and fulfill the same social izing functions, as a natural family." 
By this measure, an existing legally recognized fami ly wiu'1 same-sex 
parents clearly partakes of the family values that invoke constitutional 
protection when they migrate to a new state. 
Likevvise, in Michael H. v. Gerald D.,19 Justice Scalia's plurality 
opinion upheld California's decision to prefer legally sanctioned rela-
tionships to biological ties. California's domestic relations law excluded 
a biological father from parental rights where the mother sought to 
invoke the presumption of paternity aris ing out of her on-going legal 
mmTiage with anoti1er man. Justice Scalia read prior federal precedent 
to accord cons titutional protection to "relationships that develop within 
T /. 431 U.S. 816 (1977) . 
18. id. at 844 (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 4D6 U.S. 205, 231-33(1972)). See also Smith , 
4.J l U .S. at 846: 
It is one t>'ling to say that individuals may acquire a libert"f interes< against arbitrary 
govemment?.J interference in the family-like associations i.;1!0 which they have free ly 
c11tered, even in the absence of biological connection or state-law recognition of the 
rebtionship. It is qu.ite another to say that one may acquire such an interest in the face 
of ~110ther's constitutionally recognized li berty interest that derives from bloc.d relation-
ship, state-law sanction, and basic human right. 
In the case of a same-:;ex relationship of the son we are discussing, of course, t..'1ere is no compet-
i.ng d2im on the part of a biological parent, and the fam.i ly can invoke tbc sanction of another 
~tate 1 S law. 
79. 49 ! u.s. 110 (1989) . 
DD [ ~l ei© ~ 
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the unitary family,"80 typified by a "marital family ."81 He relied on a 
tradition of protecting "the marital family"82 against the claims of out-
siders, the "aversion to declaring children illegitimate,"83 combined 
with the importance of protecting a "extant mmital family" to uphold 
California's decision to exclude the biological father fro m parental 
rights. 34 Despite its impact on the interests of the biological father a.'ld 
his child, California was free to preserve t.~e " integrity of tt'le tradition-
a! fami ly unit."85 
Again, if the Court recognizes the imoonr.u1ce of protecting a 
legally constructed "marital" family against th,;; disruptior. by a b.iologi-
cal, but non-marital parent, it should recognize: the magnitude of the 
loss imposed where a same sex "m;u-i tal family'' fmTnally established in 
Hawaii is subjected to the penalty of dissolution upon migration. 
In the case of a Hawaiian emigrant fami ly with children, more-
over, the argument for recognition is strengthened by the interests of 
children who will lose the legal relationship to one of the only two 
parents they have ever known because of t.l-J.e receiving state's refusal to 
recognize the existence of ai1 existing marital fami ly. A child who is 
deprived of legal recognition of one of two parents suffers significant 
deprivation.86 Where one parent dies or a current marital relationship 
dissolves the effects of non-recognition could be traumatic. 
While the parents themselves could avoid the threat of a Pennsyl-
vania dissolution by remaining in Hawaii, the children involved have 
no such choice. To deprive them of existing family ties because of 
80. ld. at 123. 
81. ld. at n.3. 
82. ld. at 124. 
83. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 125. 
84. id. at 129. 
85. id. at 130. At least one New York court has applied similar reasoning against a biologi-
cal father who, as a sperm donor, had previously waived parental right>, and now sought to estab-
lish his paterr>jty with respect to a child who had been raised in a family by a lesbian couple. See 
In re Thomas S. v. Robin Y., 599 N.Y.S.2d 377, 382 (Farn.Ct. 1993) (observing that the child 
viewed the biological father as an "outsider attacking her family") rev 'd, 618 N.Y.S.2d 356 (App. 
Div. 1994) stay granted, 85 N.Y.2d 925 (1995). 
86. See, e.g., In re M.M.D. & B.H.M., 662 A.2d 837, 858 (D.C. App. 1995) (interest of 
child of same sex union in "formaliz[ed] parental relationship"); In re Jacob. 86. N.Y.2d 651, 658 
(1995) (interest of child of same-sex union in access to social security and life insurance benefits, 
health insurance, inheritance, obligation for economic support. parental ability to make medical 
decisions as well as benefits of permanency of parental figures); In re Adoption of Tammy, 416 
Mass. 205, 214 (1993) (interest of child of same sex couples in opporturjty to inherit, access to 
health insurance benefits, and "preservation] of unique filial ties"); In re Adoptions of B.L.V.B. 
aiJd E.L.V.B, 160 Vt. 368, 376 (1993) ("financial support and emotional well-being" of child from 
recognition of parental relationship in same-sex parmership). 
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tl-)eir parents' decision to migrate is at odds with the constitutional 
stricture agai..nst imposing burdens on chiidren because of their parents 
actions. Tnus, the Court has regularly invalidated "classifications that 
burden illegitimate children for the sake of punishing the illicit rela-
tions of the ir parents, because 'visiting this condemnation on the head 
of an infant is illogical and unjust. " '87 Li.!,;:ewise, the court in Plyler v. 
Doe88 was unwilling to sanction the exdnsion of L~e children of ille-
gal immigrants from public schools; while "[their] parents have the 
ability to copJorm their conduct to societal non-ns, and presumably u'1e 
ability to remove themseives from the State's jurisdiction, the chi l· 
dren . .. can affect neither u"1eir parents' conduct nor their own stc-
tus ."89 Like non-marital children, children of same-sex couples face 
potential social difficulties even in L~e absence of state discrimination 
triggered by their parents actions. Li.lce u~e children of illegal immi-
grants , they stand liable to be deprived of parental relationships not 
because of what they have done, but because of who their parents are; 
indeed what their parents have done was entirely legal in their previous 
state of residence. 
Tnis foc us on " family values" is more tha .. '1 an exercise in hypo-
thetical construction. While relatively few same-sex couples from Ha-
waii are likely to emigrate with their children to the mainland in the 
next few years, other jurisdictions have begun to recognize same-sex 
couples as parents without Hawaii's constitutional fanfare. 90 For t.l-Je 
more numerous families that h<~ve established their households in these 
states in contemplation of continued legal relationships, the disruptive 
potential of exclusionary legislation is equally severe. Where one 
state' s laws establish family units involving sarne-sex couples precisely 
in order to provide both tangible a..'1d psychic benefits to children of 
stable fam ilies ,91 to deprive children of those benefits because of their 
87 . Clark v. kter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (quoting Weber v. Aema Cas. & Sur. Co. 41}6 
U.S. 164, 175 (1972)). 
88. 457 U.S . 202 (19 82). 
89 . !d. at 220 (quoting Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 770 (1977)). 
90. For states establishing fam ily units by adoption, see In re M.M.D. & B.H.M., 662 A.2d 
837 (D.C. App. 1995); In re Jacob, 86 N.Y.2d 651 (1995); In reAdoption of Tammy, 416 Mass . 
205 (1993); In re Adoptions of B.L.V.B. and E.L.V.B., 160 Vt. 368 (1993); In rePetition of K.M. 
and D.M. to Adopt Olivia M., 274 Til. App.3d 189 (1995); In re Adoption of a Child by J.lV! .G. 
267 N.J. Super. 622 (1993); In reAdoption of Two Children by H.N.R., 285 N.J. Super. l (1995). 
For states recognizing visita tion rights in dissolved same sex family units , see Holtzman v. 
Knorr (!n re Custody of H.S.H.-K.) , 193 Wis.2d 649 (1995); A.C. v. C.B., 113 N.M. 58 1 (1992); 
J.A.L. v. E.P.H., 682 A.2d 13 14 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996). 
91. See, e.g .. In re M.M.D. & B.H.M. , 662 A.2d 837, 857 (D.C. App. 1995) (allowing adop-
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parents' decision to migrate to a new state raises constitutional objec-
tions of the first order. 
I realize, of course, that t.~~is is hardly an airtight legal argument. 
On one front, it is clear that the Court has thus far invoked the value of 
the "marital fami ly" as a method of justifying government decisions, 
rather than a basis for challenging r...1em. Justice Scalia has cautioned, 
for a pluraiity, against "tum[ing] around" the approval in iY.tichael H . of 
" favored treatment" of traditional fa .. 'Ttily relationships into " a consti-
tutional requirement that [a] State [must] recognize (the primacy of 
those relationships] ."92 Establishing the prernise t1at a legally recog-
nized non-biological family that h3s developed intima~c emotional link-
ages has a constitutional interest in remaining intact requires extrapola-
tion from current doctrine. 
On a second front, the recognition of a constitutional interest does 
not mean that interest w ili prevail. States are, in appropriately severe 
cases, entitled to dismember even traditional families in the interests of 
protecting chi ldren. The fam ily values argument puts directly at issue 
the factual premise that it is a grave deprivation to sunder childrens' 
relationship with their non-biological parent in a same-sex marriage. 
The premise is not likely to go unchallenged, for there are certainly 
states that will maintain that gays and lesbians are per se unfit parents. 
This, indeed, is the primary argument advanced in the most recent 
round of litigation in Hawaii on behalf of the state's supposed "com-
pelling interest" in denying recognition to same sex marital unions.93 
But this challenge is, it seems to me, an opportunity. Unlike the 
appropriate definition of "marriage," the issue of what hurts children 
can be joined on a basis which both is susceptible to concrete proof 
and allows advocates to dramatize the human costs of non-recognition. 
I am not sure what proof v,;onld disabuse a judge of an :intuition Ll-J.at 
" marriage" is by definition the union of a man and a woman; 1t 1s quite 
clear, however, how to present e·1idence that childrer1 are in pain.~>'· 
tion by second parent " formalize[s ] a pa;ental relationship that [the child) r·~cognizes in fac t"; 
" (assures] ongoing responsibility" "assure[s] legal access and support" in the event of separation, 
al lows access to health insurance by child) . 
92. Cruzan v. Dir. , Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 26 1, 286 (1990). Cf Reno v. Flores, 507 
U.S. 292 (1993) (refusing to recognize right of potentially deportable minors to release into custo-
dy of "responsible adults" other than parents or guardians). 
93. See Baehr v. Miike, No. CIV. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *3 (Ha'"'· Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 
1996) (state claims interest in promoting "optimal development of children is inconsistent with 
same-sex marriage); see id. at * 18 (holding state has failed to establish any adverse effect on 
children). 
94. In the era of miscegenation statutes, judges professing deep hostili ty to interracial cohab-
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The ~xtant studies suggest t.l-}at the state will have a hord case to 
ma.l(e,95 and it will rapidly become clear the extent to which animosir-y 
toward gays and lesbians is at work. 
Tne argument from family values has L~e virtue of focusing atten · 
tion on the real human costs associated with a denial of recognition to 
extraterritorial same sex marriages. If there is something wrong •;vith 
these denials., it is not primarily an affront to I-Iawaii' s sovereign inter-
ests. It is the practical cnJ.elty of disrnemberi11g a farnily that has bet~:..-; 
legally joined, and the denial of equal respect in refusing to acks10"~' l- -­
;;dge 1 legally sanctioned relationship on the basis of invidio us animu:;. 
Relatively rarely carl constitutional i11tervention establish loving rdc. 
tionships, but the argument from family values at least provides the 
hope of focusing on the reasons to prevent the states from extinguish 
ing loving families which already exist. 
i;;;cion were or.en anrac<.ed to the comparable claim that L!-Je interest o f the childr en in the ir legit-
imacy '"nder ~n existing marriage was of greater import than the affront to loc~.i morals. See Stat,; 
v. Ross . 76 N.C. 224 (1877) (importance of allowing children of marriage to migrate 3r.d b-e con-
sidered legitimate); Greenhaw v. James, 80 Va. 636 (1885) (Richardson, j,, di ssenting) (refusal to 
?.ccord re-::ognition would v isit the sins of the parent upon the "unoffending child"); cf Medway v. 
Needhar.:, l6 Mass. 157, 159-60 (1819) (focusing on " great inconvenience and cruelty of bastard-
izing the issue of such marri ages"). 
95. For recent overviews, see, e.g., Charlotte J. Patterson, Adoption of Minor Child ren by 
Lesbian and Gay Adults: A Social Science Perspective, 2 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & 
POLICY 191 (1995); Marc Elovitz, Adoption by Lesbian and Gay People: The Use and Mis-Use of 
Social Science Research, 2 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POUC Y 207 (1995); Dav id K. 
Flaks, Gay and Lesbian Families: Judicial Assumptions, Scientific Realities, 3 WM. & MARY BILL 
RTS. J. 345 (1994); Patric ia Falk, The Gap Between Psychosocial Assumptions and Empirical 
Research in Lesbian iHother Child Custody Cases in REDEFINING FAMILIES: IMPLICATIONS FOR 
CHILDREN 'S DEVELOPMENT 131 (Adele E. Gottfried & Allen W. Gottfried, eds., 1994); Robert L. 
Barret & Bryan E. Robinson, Gay Dads, in REDEF!NlNG FAMILIES: L\IPLlCATIONS FOR CHJLDREN'S 
DEVELOPMENT 157 (Adele E. Gottfried & Allen W. Gottfried, eds., 1994); See Baehr v. Miike, 
No. CIV. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *17 (Haw. Cir. Ct Dec. 3, 1996) (holding t.IJat evidence 
established no link b-etween same-sex parents and adverse effects on children). 
